Περὶ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ κατὰ μὲν νόησιν πολλὰ λέγεται, θεωρεῖται δὲ ἀνοησίᾳ κρείττονι νοήσεως, ὡς περὶ τοῦ καθεύδοντος διὰ μὲν ἐγρηγόρσεως πολλὰ λέγεται, διὰ δὲ τοῦ καθεύδειν ἡ γνῶσις καὶ ἡ κατάληψις· τῷ γὰρ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον γινώσκεται, ὅτι πᾶσα γνῶσις τοῦ γνωστοῦ ὁμοίωσις.
| On the subject of that which is beyond Intellect, many statements are made on the basis of intellection, but it may be immediately cognised only by means of a non-intellection superior to intellection; even as concerning sleep many statements may be made in a waking state, but only through sleeping can one gain direct knowledge and comprehension; for like is known by like, because all knowledge consists of assimilation to the object of knowledge.
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Porph. Sent. 25, p. 15, 1–6 Lamberz. English tr. in Porphyre, Sentences, 2005, 804.
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What has been called the doctrine of learned ignorance or docta ignorantia holds that in order to grasp the nature of the first principle, one needs to make use not of discursive or even intuitive thought, but of a higher form of knowledge that can be likened to ignorance. Although Hermetic, Neo-Pythagorean, and Middle Platonist authors, through their use of the techniques of negative theology,39 had paved the way for this doctrine before the time of Porphyry, it found its most explicit formulation in the Tyrian philosopher. In his Sentence 25, for instance, we read:
On the subject of that which is beyond Intellect (…) i
t is grasped only by means of an ignorance superior to intellection (
ἀνοησίᾳ κρείττονι νοήσεως).
Chapter 7 Porphyry and the Theology of Aristotle in: Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes, Volume 2